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Rbstract
Recent research in linguistic analysis of presuppositions has
provided numerous indications of the role of presupposition in lexical
analysis. Still others have argued there is no distinction between the
meaning and the presupposition of a word. In this paper I discuss both
issues of what presuppositions are related to lexical analysis and what
happens to these presuppositions in discourse. Finally, I comment on
how this knowledge could be made available to a natural language
understanding program.
This report describes research done at the Artificial Inteligence
Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Support for
the laboratory's artificial intelligence research is provided in part
by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense
under Office of Naval Research contract N00014-70-A-0362-0003.
Working papers are informal papers intended for internal use.
In this paper, I want to consider the presuppositions of a
sentence uttered in discourse. I believe and will try to show that
finding the presuppositions of a sentence means one must consider the
conditions associated with a speech act of a sentence. Those
conditions, usually referred to as normal conditions, must be defined
for each verb or noun. I will show what happens when the conditions do
not hold or are modified in some way by the discourse. In defining the
conditions for a speech act, I will be relying on the work of many
others who will be mentioned in the next several pages.
Stalnaker (1970) has defined a certain class of presuppositions
which he calls pragmatic presupposition in the following way:
A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a
given context just in case:
1.) The speaker assumes or believes that P.
2.) The speaker assumes or believes his audience assumes or
believes that P.
3.) The speaker assumes or believes that his audience recognizes
that he has assumed these things.
I think this is a very general description for the specific assumptions
which Searle (1969) has listed as conditions for the use of the verb
promise. Searle's analysis is significant because it describes a fair
number of the facts native speakers rely on when using the verb
promise. For a computer-based natural language program such facts will
be necessary if it is to adequately understand and generate natural
language. If Searle's conditions for a speech act verb are pragmatic
presuppositions, an analysis of the use of presuppositions is needed
for natural language programs.
In this paper, I will be assuming the presuppositions I mention
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are pragmatic presuppositions. I am more concerned about the role of
pragmatic presupposition because I believe logical presupposition can
be subsumed by it. Thus the test for a presupposition being a sentence
entailing both the given sentence and its negation is one means of
discovering the presupposition, but I will show it does not always
reveal the presupposition and in some cases leads us to believe there
is none. Furthermore, those linguists and philosophers defining
presupposition as logical presupposition hold that the falseness of a
presupposition of a sentence implies an incoherent usage of the
sentence. I want to consider in this paper cases where the pragmatic
presupposition of a sentence may be denied and still permit the
sentence to have meaningful use. I will not offer a formal definition
of what meaningful is, but instead I will presume that native speakers
can judge intuitively about it. I also want to consider what causes a
sentence to be considered incoherent in a given context when the
presupposition is denied in a certain way.
In constructing the set of normal conditions for use of a word, I
hope to provide an indication of how this knowledge could be available
to a computer-based natural language understanding program. At various
points in this paper, I will comment on computer implementation of this
knowledge.
Various linguists and philosophers have indicated what
presuppositions are associated with certain words of English and
certain functions of those words. Searle's contribution has already
been mentioned. Fillmore (1971a, b) provides for lexical entries on
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nouns like criticize and accuse. Karttunen (1973) has described how
certain classes of verbs and conjuctions function to filter the
presuppositions of complement verbs and clauses of conjunctions.
Others have pointed out the presuppositions associated with definite
names (Keenan, 1971), adjectives like only (Keenan) and other (Nash-
webber, 1972), factive verbs (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1971) and the
conjunction but (R. Lakoff, 1971). Most of these writers associate
such information with the semantics of the language and in some cases
with lexical entries of the given words. I share this viewpoint
especially because in use of a computer program, I can conceive of a
lexical entry as a procedure and hence attain access to different parts
of the sentence more easily than in a static dictionary look-up method.
On this view I differ strongly with Wilson (1975) who argues,
based on a number of sentences, that there is no distinction between
the presuppositional aspect of the semantic structure of a predicate on
the one hand and the meaning proper of the predicate on the other.
What I want to show is how the presuppositions triggered by lexical
entries come into play in context.
In the next several pages, I will describe the various lexical
entries for several classes of words. Much of this work is based on
those mentioned earlier and in many cases, I will be describing exactly
their ideas. The classes I will consider include:
1. nouns
2. verbs
3. definite articles and definite references
4. adjectives
5. conjunctions
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There seem to be relatively few nouns which have associated
presuppositions. The agrument for the presuppositions of adult, male
and human to the word bachelor given by Langendoen (1971) states that
sentence 1 would be an unusual device for communicating information
concerning my neighbor's maturity, species or sex, but not his marital
status. By similar agrument one could argue for a particular sex class
presupposition to such nouns as father, mother, aunt, and sptnster.
Counter arguments to this use of presuppositions have been offered and
I will discuss this further in the paper.
(1) My neighbor isn't a bachelor.
In determining the presupposition of nouns preceded by the
definite article the, or the pronomial adjectives this, that, these,
those, or proper nouns, one need only be convinced that any definite
reference presupposes existence of the referent. Hence
(2) The man-in-the-moon looked down on the earth.
(3) This pen writes very well.
(4) Mortimer told Winnifred all the bad news.
all presuppose existence of their respective proper nouns and definite
references. The reader may object to the presupposition which is
sentence 5 by claiming that there is no man who is the man-in-the-moon.
While I quite agree, it is still the case that a referent exists for
"the man-in-the-moon." It is this sense that I am claiming is
presupposed. Finally, definite reference of the genitive form as in
"John's toy," "my octopus" and "brother of the king" presuppose
respectively that John has a toy, I have an octopus and the king has a
brother. This kind. of presupposition has been pointed out by Keenan.
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(5) The man-in-the-moon exists.
The presuppositions of certain adjectives and qualifiers demand
attention here. Other when used as an adjective in a parallel
construction such as A and other B's signals the presupposition that A
is a B. The difficulty with other is the variety of forms the parallel
construction can take. Nash-Webber cites these as examples among
others:
(6) Gorse and wormwood, in addition to other reputedly magic
herbs, grow in profusion.
(7) Residents, interns and other clinical specialists are
available for consultation.
(8) Since other sixth graders were allowed to stay up until 10
o'clock, Mary wanted to also.
A constrast which Nash-Webber points out is that inter-sentential use
of other links the discourse but allows for a kind of exclusion. Thus,
according to Nash-Webber, one may talk about "the cat in the hat who
came back" and then about "other cats" presupposing all cats but
specifically excluding "the cat in the hat" from the discussion of
other cats. In such cases the presupposition, which is easy to
formulate, that the cat in the hat is a cat is not terribly
interesting. What is important to bear in mind is that the
presupposition attached to the use of other says nothing about
reference. Thus when referring to "other cats," presuppositional
information says nothing about whether that refers to the cat in the
hat or not. This observation means it is straightforward to note the
presupposition for the cat in the hat case even though the problem of
defining the reference is not. However, a precedure triggered on the
lexical entry of other in order to associate the presupposition with
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the correct set of nouns would rely strongly on knowledge of various
grammatical constructions to find that A that is a B in such sentences
as 6 or 8.
In contrast to other are uses of all, some, most, jfe, and several.
If any of these is substituted for other in sentences 6, 7 or 8, the
presuppositional information changes. For all, several and most, the
presuppositions are:
(6a) Gorse and wormwood are not magic herbs.
(7a) Residents and interns are not clinical specialists.
(8a) Mary is not a sixth grader.
The use of some and few do not cause the presuppositions 6a, 7a 8a or
their negations: they are neutral on presuppositions. Since the
sentences 9, 10 and 11 do not have presuppositions associated with the
qualifier words, it is clear that triggering presuppositional analysis
on lexical entries must be a conditional action occurring only in the
existence of certain grammatical constructions, such as tn addttton to.
In computer-based language systems, this means tight interaction
between semantic and syntax, the conclusion of Winograd (1971) for a
more general use of natural language. I do not think analysis of
presuppositions for other is as grim as Nash-Webber has indicated.
While it is true that existing parsers and semantics systems cannot
analyze these, little research has been done at present on the role of
grammatical constructions in semantics. Such research, while non-
trivial, is not impossible and could provide the needed additional step
to handle presuppositions in constructions using other.
(9) Most boys eat their beans.
(10) All girls are afraid of spiders.
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(11) Several children need better nuitritional care.
Another adjective causing a sentence to have a presupposition is
only. Examples of this are sentences 12 and 13 which have
presuppositions 12a and 13a respectively.
(12) Only Jane danced with Bill last night.
(12a) Jane danced with Bill last night.
(13) The teacher only gave an F to Frank.
(13a) The teacher gave an F to Frank.
The formation of the presupposition is straightforward for this
adjective and I can find no use of only that is different (I am
excluding the use of only if since that is a form of ti...then
inversion.).
There already has been a great deal written, often with
conflicting views, about the presuppositions of sentences which have
verbs taking a complement. The approach taken by Fillmore on verbs of
judging is to analyze who the judge and defendent are and what the
situation is and to determine what presuppositions there are about any
of these. Thus in 14 the presupposition is only that the situation of
writing an obscene letter is bad since accuse triggers that
presupposition. On the other hand, in 15, Bill is presupposed
responsible for the writing as well as presupposing that the situation
of writing the letter i.s bad because criticize triggers both of these.
(14) John accused Bill of writing an obscene letter.
(15) John criticized Bill for writing an obscene letter.
The approach is useful for two reasons. For one, it extends the
analysis of speech acts begun by Searle, and secondly it allows
considerations of the presuppositions of verbs that were said to block
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presuppositions of the complement sentences, called "plugs" by
Karttunen. Fillmore's treatment maintains Karttunen's observations
about plugs but shows that the plug verbs do have associated
presuppositions of other types. Fillmore and Karttunen disagree on the
presuppositions of critticitze since Karttunen believes it is a plug and
Fillmore's examples show that it doesn't block all presuppositions of
the complement sentence, but for this particular verb I think Karttunen
is just mistaken.
I also want to make some remarks about Karttunen's "hole" verbs
which he believes include know, reget, understand, surprise, be
signtficant, begin, stop, continue, manage, avoid, be able, be possible,
force, prevent, hesitate, seem, be probable and the factives of Kiparsky
and Kiparsky. A hole works such that all the presuppositions of the
complement sentence are presuppositions of the main sentence. On
careful analysis which I will reproduce below, I believe there are two
kinds of holes: takers and let-thru holes, i.e., those that take the
complement sentence as a presupposition and those that let-thru only
the presuppositions of the complement sentence. For example, in
sentence 16, since realtze is a taker, one of the presuppositions is
that John's wife was being unfaithful; while in 17, since be posstible
is a let-thru hole, this presupposition does not hold, but the
presupposition that John has a wife does.
(16) John realized his wife was being unfaithful.
(17) It was possible that John's wife was being unfaithful.
The class of let-thru verbs includes: manage, hesttate, be able,
seem, doubt, suspect, fear, think, be possible, and be probable. To
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analyze these verbs, I will consider sentences that use these verbs.
In each case I have found it useful to try to compose the kind of list
of conditions which Searle provides for promise. I won't reproduce all
of these, but hint at the important points in them.
MANAGE--Sentence 18 does not have the presupposition 18a, but only
the presuppositions of 18a which include 18b. There is also a
presupposition from the about existence, but these referent
presuppositions will not be listed unless they are the only ones. My
observation about 18b seems plausible because manage means "to bring
about" hence the truth of 18 implies the truth of 18a but does not
presuppose it. This analysis seems to agree with that of Joshi and
Weischedel (1973).
(18) We managed to finish the painting.
(18a) We finished the painting.
(18b) We worked on the painting.
HESITATE--Sentence 19 does not presuppose 19a, but it does
presuppose what 19a does, namely 19b. Here I seem to categorically
disagree with Karttunen, but that is due to the fact that hesitate to
do X for me suggests:
a. Doer of hesitation considers doing action X.
b. Doer of hesitation is not currectly doing X.
c. After consideration, doer may or may not do X.
With this description I find it hard to understand why "Fred hesitated
to stop beating his wife" presupposes "Fred stopped beating his wife."
(19) Harry hesitated beating his wife.
(19a) Harry beat his wife.
(19b) Harry has a wife.
BE ABLE--Sentence 20 does not presuppose 20a since to be able
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means potential for action but no commitment to an action. I should
point out there is a second use of be able which only in the past tense
presupposes the complement sentence. Thus one reading of 20b
presupposes 20a.
(20) Tom is able to stop Bill from moving the boxes.
(20a) Tom stopped Bill from moving the boxes.
(20b) Tom was able to stop Bill from moving the boxes.
SEEM--In sentence 21 there is no presupposition that "Henry
stopped wanting to eat artichokes" although seems functions in such a
manner that the hearer expects this to be the case with further
evidence. Sentence 21 does presuppose 21a.
(21) Poor Henry seemed to stop wanting to eat artichokes.
(21a) Poor Henry wanted to eat artichokes.
DOUBT--In general doubt functions to clue the reader to expect the
negation of the complement sentence to be true. Thus in 22, the only
presuppositions are 22a and 22b, and an expectation that 22c is true is
created, but is not presupposed.
(22) I doubt you have the frog in your pocket.
(22a) A frog exists.
(22b) You have a pocket.
(22c) You don't have the frog in your pocket.
SUSPECT, FEAR, BE POSSIBLE, BE PROBABLE--these four verbs function
like doubt, but in contrast the expectation is the truth of the
complement sentence. Thus in 23, the presuppositions are 23a and 23b,
not 23c. Similarly in 24, 24a but not 24b.
(23) John (suspects, fears) that he understood his wife's
mutterings.
(23a) John's wife muttered something.
(23b) John has a wife.
(23c) John understood his wife's mutterings.
(24) It is (possible, probable) that Hilda committed suicide.
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(24a) Hilda is dead.
(24b) Hilda commited suicide.
Now let me consider briefly the takers which can be sub-divided
into two groups, the positive and the negative takers. Positive takers
include realize, criticize, persuade, reget, surprise, be obvious, start,
be significant, stop, continue and perhaps know which I will say more
about later. Negative takers include suppose, assume, pretend, prevent,
avoid, and possibly dream which I also have further comments on. The
negative takers presuppose the negation of the complement sentence and
hence their name. Sentences like 54 and 55 which presuppose 54a and
55a respectively exemplify the negative takers.
(54) Corrupt administration prevented the governor from running
for president.
(54a) The governor did not run for president.
(55) The teacher assumed the students had done their homework.
(55a) The students had not done their homework.
For most of these verbs, there are additional presuppositions
associated with them. For example, crittcze by Fillmore's (1971b)
account has a presupposition that the situation being criticized is
bad. Start has a presupposition that previous to starting whatever the
action or event is, the starter was not doing that action or
participating in the event. Similarly, continue has a presupposition
about previous time and stop has a presupposition about the action
taking place before the stopping.
Before natural language programs can use this information, the
presuppositions which are conditions for the use of these verbs must be
catalogued. For some verbs, like dream, this analysis will be
difficult as is evidenced by the work of Shanon (1975) who has pointed
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out a number of conditions about how one reports dreams linguistically.
He states:
The state of affairs within the dream world is assumed not be
different from the one in the real world unless otherwise
specified. More specifically, whenever there is factual
correspondence between the two worlds, one assumes that in the
real world the speaker knows the facts which are reported as part
of the dream. In order to indicate that this is not the case, the
reporter of the dream should include the explicit statement of
knowledge in the dream report.
Shanon's analysis not only tells us that there are presuppositions
associated with the use of dream, but also how these presuppositions
relate to the speaker's and the hearer's knowledge about the world.
This sort of detailed analysis can replace the straight categorical
explanation above.
The verb know requires attention because it is used in sentences
like 25 and 26. To my way of thinking, know cannot be used unless the
complement sentence is fact. Hence John doesn't know about Nixon's
honesty; he only believes Nixon is honest. Red Riding Hood only knows
she is going to grandmother's once she actually starts on the journey.
The problem with knowing, as many have stated, is we often use know for
what we believe are facts. Tnus in the 1300's people knew the earth
was flat. We could argue that in such cases know has been used
wrongly, but this happens so often such analysis would fail to predict
the actual use of language by native speakers. Instead it can be said
that know must be used relative to a world model and can be used
correctly or not depending on that model. Thus my comments on John and
Red Riding Hood's knowing are based on my current world view. I will
discuss the case of know further in the third section after some
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additional groundwork has been laid.
(25) John knows that Nixon is an honest man.
(26) Red Riding Hood knows she is going to her grandmother's
house.
A last remark I want to make about verbs has to do with non-
complement verbs which some linguists (Langendoen) have claimed have
presuppositions. Such verbs include, for. example, clean, open and
shut. Clean presupposes that whatever is being cleaned is dirty, while
open that it is not open, and shut that it is not shut. Now this seems
reasonable, but the presupposition negation test fails. Thus in 27,
the bathroom might not have been cleaned because it already was clean,
or in 28 the door not opened because it may have been open. Further,
29 may be true because Sarah is eccentric and cleans even clean
windows.
(27) Mary didn't clean the bathroom.
(28) Smith didn't open the door.
(29) Sarah cleaned the windows.
My answer to this argument is one I will make again in this paper. The
presuppositions here do hold: they are the normality conditions under
which the verb is used. What I believe about presuppositions is that
they can become the: topic of discourse. Thus 27 could be followed
either by 30 which supports the presupposition of clean or by 31 which
denies it.
(30) Mary was too lazy to do her work.
(31) It wasn't dirty.
In either of the cases above, sentence 27 provides the reader with
a situation in the world and some statements about the world (Mary
exists, the bathroom exists, the bathroom is dirty). The readers must
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bring to bear their semantic knowledge about the meaning of clean and
its presupposition, as well as what the actors and objects of clean
refer to. Using these it is posssible to interpret 27 and obtain
possible presupposition 27a. They must also rely on "pragmatic" or
"general" knowledge for some additional relevant information like
knowing Mary is too lazy to clean anything or the bathroom isn't dirty.
These two kinds of knowledge result in an overall picture of the world
in which presuppositions may or may not be true. The difficulty in the
semantic-general knowledge distinction is that much general knowledge
comes from sentences and from using semantic knowledge to interpret
them. Thus general knowledge like Mary's laziness may come via a set
of sentences, such as 30, which are interpreted by the reader and
become part of the reader's general knowledge. I think the confusion
surrounding using semantic knowledge and getting information that may
become pragmatic knowledge has caused some linguists to believe that
semantic analysis can produce no presuppositions.
The last class of words I want to discuss is conjunctions.
Karttunen (1973) has sketched out several criteria on the logical
conjunctions if...then, or, and and. I have nothing new to add about
the role of if..then or and, but due to some examples of Wilson, I
think there is an additional role which or can play, which is to allow
the second clause to deny the presuppositions of the first. Thus 32,
33, and 34, all of which are taken from Wilson's article
"Presupposition, Assertion and Lexical Items," act in this manner. It
was Wilson's intention to use these sentences to show that Karttunen's
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approach on logical connectives is wrong. I think my observation
offers an alternative that is just as reasonable. Note that in the use
of or, the whole clause or the presupposition of the clause can do the
denying.
(32) Your teacher will be a bachelor or a spinster.
(33) Either the victim was a bachelor or no one got killed at all.
(34) Either John regrets that Bill left or Bill didn't leave.
In a similar manner, one of the uses of the conjunction but can be to
deny the presupposition of the previous clause as Robin Lakoff has
pointed out. Thus 35 (also from Wilson), which has presupposition 35a
for the first clause and 35b for the second clause, uses but to show
second clause is denying the presupposition 35a. Interestingly,
another use of but is to emphasize the presupposition as in 36.
(35) If Bill stopped smoking at midnight I'll be surprised, but if
he started smoking at midnight, I'll be amazed.
(35a) Bill was smoking before midnight.
(35b) Bill was smoking after midnight.
(36) I regret your leaving town, but you are leaving town.
The relative conjunction while also evokes presuppositions. One
use of while, according to Robin Lakoff, is in semantic opposition for
which but is also used. Thus while can be used to deny presuppositions
just as but can do. The sentences below demonstrate uses of whiltte.
(37) John is rich (while, but) Bill is poor.
(38) John regretted that Mary was dead (while, but) Bill regetted
that Mary was alive.
The purpose of this section has been twofold. One purpose is to
make clear what we currently know about presuppositional analysis based
on lexical entries. The second purpose is to show how lexical entries
can be used in determining the presupposition of a single sentence. I
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would like to turn my attention now to discourse and consider what
happens to the presuppositions which are set up by lexical analysis.
The following paragraph I is intended to point out one of the ways
in which presupposition can be used in discourse.
I. Fred, a notorious liar, wasn't married. He decided to go see
a psychiatrist, Sally, for counselling about his habit of
lying. But Fred couldn't help telling even bigger lies, so he
told Sally he had been beating his wife and needed counselling
to stop. Sally counselled Fred for many months on his wife
beating, knowing that Fred would eventually triumph over his
problem. Finally the day arrived when Fred came beaming into
Sally's office. Just from Fred's expression, Sally knew Fred
had stopped beating his wife.
An observation to make about the last sentence of I is that it has
the presuppositions 39 and 40. These presuppositions are triggered by
the complement sentence of the predicate kaow. Now the reader is aware
from the first part of I that 39 and 40 are false. On most
philosophical and linguistic views, this means that the last sentence
is incoherent, but I think the reader will agree it is perfectly
coherent in 1. The state of the world is complex in discourse, so truth
and falsity are relative in it. Fred, who doesn't beat wives and has
no wife, has caused Sally to perceive the world such that Fred beats
his wife and wishes to stop. To the reader, who knows the world in
which both Fred and Sally are acting, the important information of the
last sentence is what Sally knows from Fred's beaming face; the
background information are presuppositions 39 and 40. The fact that 39
and 40 are false from the reader's view do not hinder the communication
about Sally at all, but instead the use of know makes clear that Sally
takes 39 and 40 as fact. We can begin to understand from I that
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presuppositions exist relative to a point of view of the world. While
researchers in Artificial Intelligence have been aware of the
complexity of states of the world and points of view being relative to
it (McDermott, 1974, is one such example), the impact of this idea is
yet to be felt in analysis of presupposition.
(39) Fred has a wife.
(40) Fred has beaten his wife.
Let us consider the idea that presuppositions exist relative to a
point of view further with another example, case II below.
II. Suppose that there are two unicorns A and B in some room and
that unicorn A is standing in a corner of the room while
unicorn B lies in the middle of it. How do we get unicorn A
to sit next to his fellow unicorn? That's easy. I need only
ask a virgin to sit in the middle of the room and coax the
unicorn to put its head in her lap for as everyone knows
unicorns follow only the commands of virgins.
Does the last sentence of II presuppose the existence of a unicorn
since the "the" reference in II presupposes the existence of a unicorn?
Or do we say unicorns can't have a referent since they don't exist and
hence we are using definite reference in a special way here? It seems
clear that the existence of unicorns is assumed in the suppose of the
first sentence of II. The use of suppose sets up a view in which
unicorns do exist. Once this is done, the unicorn's existence can be
presupposed by other sentences which make definite references to
unicorns. We need no special use of definite reference but what we do
need is the background assumption that unicorns exist. One purpose of
dialogue, I believe, is to make these assumptions, and then proceed
using them as backgound conditions for other events. This is the role
of presupposition in both I and II.
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The situation in II is even more complicated actually. Suppose
has a presupposition which is the negation of the complement sentence.
Thus the first sentence of II presupposes that there really aren't any
unicorns in the room. It begins to sound as if we believe and don't
believe there are unicorns, which would be hard to assert. What we
have here are two contexts, one in which unicorns don't exist and one
in which they do. The former, which is the normal state of my world,
is set aside by the assumption of suppose, but the reader is made aware
of my normal view of the world because of the presuppositions evoked by
suppose.
Sometimes a discourse may be used to doubt the presuppositions of
sentences of the dialogue. Consider case III below.
III. Frieda and Alf had been married for 20 years. During all
that time Frieda did the cooking. That Frieda liked to cook
wasn't obvious to her husband, for all the meals she had
ever cooked were either undercooked or burned or prepared
only with a great deal of muttering and disgust.
The presupposition of the last sentence of III is 41. However, the
discourse is serving the purpose of doubting this presupposition by
evidence of someone not liking to cook. Presupposition 41 is never
stated as being false, but indications are given that lead us to
believe that this is so.
(41) Frieda liked to cook.
It may be worthwhile to point out that grammatical construction
plays a part in producing doubt about the presupposition. By using the
negative form of the predicate of the last sentence and using a
relative clause like because that signals reason for the truth of the
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main clause, we get the attempt to deny the presupposition of the
complement sentence. I point this out because the same sentence with
wasn't replace by was performs very differently in this discourse.
In case III, a second type of presupposition is being relied on as
well. In III, we have a set of facts about the way someone has been
cooking. While it is not stated, most people in U.S. culture presume
that these fact indicate not liking to cook, which can by summed up by
42. The presupposition, however, is not evoked by any of the lexical
entries of the various words in the discourse. Such presuppositions
are often called pragmatic presuppositions to distinguish them from
presuppositions signalled by semantics. I think this usage is
unfortunate, for both presuppositions signalled by semantics and
presuppositions like 42 generated from a reader's general knowledge are
described by Stalnaker's definition of pragmatic presupposition. Hence
I will refer to presuppositions triggered by semantics as semantically
based presuppositions and presuppositions based on general knowledge of
the world as general knowledge presuppositions.
(42) People who undercook food or overcook it and grumble while
cooking probably don't like to cook.
Presuppositions cannot only be doubted but asserted. Consider IV,
a variation of III.
IV. Frieda and Alf had been married for 20 years. During all
that time Frieda did the cooking. That Frieda liked to cook
wasn't obvious to her husband, but he had never been in the
kitchen to see how she smiled when she cooked potatoes,
tasted sauces and decorated desserts. In fact Alf was a very
unobservent fellow.
Again in IV, we start off with presupposition 41 and a construction
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which doubts it via the negation of be obutous. The use of but, as I
have pointed out, can emphasize a presupposition as happens here.
Another general knowledge presupposition about indications of liking to
cook supports presupposition 41.
An additional comment can be made about presuppositions here. In
neither III or IV can the reader be assumed to have known anything
about Frieda's cooking likes before reading the paragraphs.
Presupposition 41 is triggered by the use of certain predicates and it
has a pre-determined true value. As we have seen, this value can be
denied or asserted in discourse. That presupposition 41 was not known
before the discourse is one important difference between semantically
triggered and general knowledge presuppositions.
I want to consider one other case of the use of presupposition in
discourse. The idea for this paragraph comes from Wilson who believes
the presuppositions of sentence 43 will make wrong predictions about
the speech act content of that command since in the situation where all
teachers are known to be bachelors or spinsters, 36 would be used tell
Jemima that Bill's teacher is a male.
(43) Point out to Jemima that Bill's teacher is a bachelor.
In case V, I have written a discourse which describes this situation.
I have avoided using exactly sentence 43 because point out like tell
and explain are plugs. Instead I have used a sentence with a taker
predicate and I hope the sentence performs that same communication
purposes.
V. All of the teachers in Bill's school are either bachelors or
spinsters. Jemima knew that Bill's mother would object if
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Bill's teacher weren't a bachelor. Since Bill's mother hadn't
objected, Jemima realized that Bill's teacher was a male.
As I have already pointed out, the use of or in the first sentence
denies the presupposition of adult and male for bachelor. In this
manner, the presupposition about the sex and maturity of Bill's teacher
is questioned. It isn't until the last sentence that the question is
resolved with another sentence presupposing that Bill's teacher is
adult and male. This presupposition re-asserts one of the
presuppositions triggered earlier in the discourse.
I have tried to show that a presupposition can be asserted,
doubted or re-asserted in discourse, but now I want to point out one
way in which a presupposition cannot be used. Since a presupposition
has a pre-determined value of true, no sentence A cam presuppose
another sentence B which denies a fact stated in the discourse unless
sentence B is denied in the discourse. Sentences which defy this rule
are incoherent in context as case VI shows.
VI. Mary went into the house and left the door open for Bill who
was blind. Bill got the front steps and wanted Mary to open
the door. Mary came and opened it.
As I have indicated, open presupposes that whatever is to be opened is
not open. In VI, we are told the door is open and then the last
sentence presupposes that the door is shut. The constraint on
presuppositions is violated and hence the last sentence is incoherent
in the discourse.
When I began this paper, I hoped to be able to describe not only
exactly what role certain words played in causing a sentence to have
presuppositions, but also to be able to describe by a set of rules
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exactly how to find what was happening to the semantically based
presuppositions in a discourse. While I think I have succeeded in the
former task, I haven't at the latter one. Determining how a person's
viewpoint is constructed, which played a part in the presuppositions in
I and II, is not an easy task, and more research is necessary before
this is adequately described. In cases III, IV and V, I have shown how
specific constructions can cause a presupposition to be doubted and in
IV and V to be re-asserted. However, there are most likely many more
constructions that can be used to do this.
I want to mention two more ways this paper is not a complete
discussion of presupposition in natural language. First I have said
little about the role of tense and mood in presupposition. This has
significance since the tenses of the presuppositions 44a and 45a vary
in sentences 44 and 45. As I have noted earlier, verbs like he able can
have certain presuppositions only in past tense. We have seen many
sentences in indicative mood with presupppositions also indicative
mood. Sentence 46 which is in the subjunctive presupposes sentence
46a, also in subjunctive. This suggests that mood is the same in the
sentence and its presupposition. Whether this is indeed the case,
needs to be studied further. Note for sentence 46 that chose has the
presupposition that the thing being chased is running.
(44) Roger opened the door.
(44a) The door was closed.
(45) Roger will open the door.
(45a) The door is closed.
(46) John may chase Henry down the street.
(46a) Henry may run down the street.
Another example of tense based presuppositions are sentences 47
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and 48. McCawley (1971) has pointed out that 47 presupposes the exhibit
still going on while 48 presupposes that the exhibit has closed.
Another case of presupposition, shown in 49, is specialized to the past
progressive form used to X where X is a verb. The presupposition is
that the doer of X no longer does these things.
(47) Have you seen the Monet exhibit?
(48) Did you see the Monet exhibit?
(49) I used to go shopping on Wednesday.
Secondly I have not considered the presuppositional content of
sentences with special stress patterns like 50-53. It appears that
stress can change all the presuppositions and add new ones too.
(50) JOHN called MARY a virgin and then SHE insulted HIM.
(Lakoff, 1971)
(51) Bill likes Harry, but HE can tolerate virtually ANYONE.
(52) Bill likes Harry, but he can TOLERATE virtually anyone.
(53) I didn't clean the BATHROOM: I cleaned the KITCHEN.
(Wilson,. 1975)
In conclusion, in this paper I have discussed a number of
different issues about the presuppositions of a sentence. First I have
argued for associating one type of presupposition with the lexical
entry of a word in language. In some cases like clean, critticze,
blame, bachelor, only and the, I have pointed out words which function
in special ways in relation to presuppositions. In other cases,
complement verbs, I have pointed out how a particular class of these
performs. Many of these verbs have specific presuppositions associate
with them in the way that blame and stop do, but I have not described
them in detail. I have also indicated some of the ways conjunctions
function in relation to presupposition. Lastly I have presented a
number of cases of discourse being used to state, deny or emphasize
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presuppositions and I've indicated an upper limit on the manner in
which this can be done. Clearly a natural language understanding
program will need to catalogue the ways in which presupposition can be
used in discourse or be able to construct this knowledge from more
general knowledge about grammatical constructions used in discourse.
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